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I.  Introduction 
 
I’ve been invited to write about contract law and critical theory, a task that 
takes me back to my initial encounter with each in Duncan Kennedy’s Contracts 
class a million years ago. Critical legal studies wasn’t even a thing yet, and – at 
least to hear Grant Gilmore tell it – contract law hadn’t been a thing for all that 
long either.1 Kennedy was likewise new to the scene, up for tenure the year we 
had him. But the intersection in question was a central preoccupation of that 
extraordinary class and the focus as well of what was soon to emerge as one of 
the original critical legal studies, provoking several generations of work on 
ideology and argument construction in contract law and beyond.2 
Much of that work has taken place in the law school classroom, where it all 
began for many of us. Indeed, the robust connection between pedagogy and legal 
theory was a staple of first-generation cls scholarship,3 and those who followed 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. Many thanks to Karl Klare for a generous and 
uncommonly insightful critique of an earlier draft; to the editors for including me in this 
important and engaging volume; and to Wolters Kluwer for graciously authorizing the use of 
considerable material from Richard Michael Fischl, Teaching Law as a Vocation: Local 1330, 
Promissory Estoppel, and the Critical Tradition in Labour Scholarship, 33 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 145 (2017). 
1 Grant Gilmore, Death of Contract (1974). 
2 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685 (1976). 
3 Classics of the genre include Karl Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 
54 New York University Law Review 876 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of 
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mentors into the legal academy continued the effort with great enthusiasm.4 
There is obviously a politics to foregrounding the classroom in one’s scholarly 
work. Treating students as collaborators in the enterprise – taking their confusion 
or opposition seriously and recognizing their Emperor’s New Clothes moments 
as a potential source of insight – reflects a commitment to ‘eliminating 
illegitimate hierarchy’ in the academic workplace (bet you haven’t heard that 
expression in a while) and offers a critique-by-example of the use of the Socratic 
method to lord professorial expertise over charges who’ve been studying law for 
all of ten minutes. But it seems to me that the central link between pedagogy and 
theoretical work in the critical tradition lies in the relentless focus on the 
recurring rhetorical structures of legal justification, a ‘demystification’ project 
that produced enormously effective classroom teaching tools and at the same 
time exposed to a broader academic and professional audience the revealing 
patterns of thought lurking in the nooks and crannies of legal reasoning.  
I will offer an extended illustration of the demystification link here and will 
focus on promissory estoppel, a doctrine that receives sustained attention in the 
typical US Contracts class and has been the focus of a great deal of scholarship, 
critical and otherwise, for decades. Following this introduction, the essay 
proceeds in two parts. In Part II, I introduce promissory estoppel the way I do in 
my classes, contrasting mainstream, legal realist, and critical ‘stories’ about the 
history and role of the doctrine in American contract law. I warn my students – 
as I am warning readers here – that the contrasting accounts are to some extent 
caricatures, for surely no self-respecting legal academic would actually admit to 
being ‘mainstream,’ and I gather from what I read in the casebooks as well as 
from discussions with others teaching the course that most of us bring insights 
from a mix of realist, critical, and other schools of thought to our classroom 
work. But the point of proceeding in this fashion is to attempt to highlight the 
 
the Structure of the Law School Curriculum, 14 Seton Hall Law Review 1 (1983); Jay M. Feinman, 
Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA Law Review 829 (1983); Mary Joe Frug, Re-
reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 American University Law 
Review 1065 (1985). 
4 See James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 American University Law Review 1003 
(1985); Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning 
Legal Reasoning, 36 Journal of Legal Education 249 (1986); Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 
Virginia Law Review 915 (1988). 
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contributions of the critical tradition to pedagogy as well as legal theory, and in 
Part III I’ll bring those contributions to bear on a critical study of the Local 1330 
case, a storied challenge to the closing of a pair of aging steel plants in the 
industrial Midwest nearly four decades ago. 
 
II. Contracts Stories 
 
A. The Mainstream Account 
 
The mainstream story of promissory estoppel goes something like this. In the 
bad old days, promises were unenforceable unless supported by consideration, 
and under the so-called ‘bargain theory’ of consideration – developed in the 
latter part of the 19th century along with so many other heartless and cruel 
common law doctrines – a promise wasn’t legally enforceable unless it was part 
of an exchange transaction. Thus, if you promised me a barrel of widgets and 
reneged on that promise, I had no legal recourse against you. Your promise was 
‘gratuitous,’ and the point of bargain theory was to render such promises 
unenforceable. But if you promised me that same barrel of widgets in exchange 
for something I gave or committed to give in return – that is, for some sort of quid 
pro quo for the widgets – then your failure to make good on the promise was an 
actionable breach of contract. 
Now most of the time the requirement of bargained-for consideration was 
not a problem, for in the commercial world the vast majority of transactions 
involve giving and getting on both sides: I work and for my efforts receive a 
salary and benefits; you sell a house and accept payment in return; etc. But in 
some commercial contexts, and in many familial, social, and charitable settings, 
people make promises with no expectation of receiving anything in return – 
apart, perhaps, from the pleasure of giving itself. So what happens if I make a 
promise – say I promise my sister-in-law a safe place to raise her family after the 
untimely death of her spouse, to take a not quite random example – but extract 
no ‘price for the promise’ in return?5 
 
5 Readers who’ve been subjected to a first-year Contracts course in the US will no doubt 
recognize the reference to the facts of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).  
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Far more often than not, what happens is that the promising party will make 
good on the commitment; fortunately for familial and other forms of social 
harmony, most people seem to keep most of their promises most of the time. 
And even if the promising party has second thoughts – where, for example, an 
ill-considered promise is made in a state of momentary exuberance or extreme 
grief – there may be no lasting problem if the second thoughts follow upon the 
first quickly enough.  
But if the promising party reneges after the would-be beneficiary has 
pursued some costly course of action on the faith of the promise – say the 
grieving widow abandons her former home and moves her family many miles 
through dangerous terrain in order to take advantage of the promised place to 
live, only to find herself and her children out on the street a short while later – 
then the requirement of bargained-for consideration has bite, and the one who 
gets bitten is the widow or, more generally, the party seeking the law’s assistance 
in holding the promising party to his word. The promise is gratuitous, the court 
would say; you gave nothing in return, so your mere reliance on the promise – 
no matter how much that reliance hurt – will not secure its enforcement. 
In the mainstream account of American contract law, the requirement of 
bargained-for consideration was the ‘majority rule’ in the late 19th century, 
seemingly just another example of the preference for commerce over caring 
during an era very much in the thrall of Social Darwinism and laissez faire. But in 
our enlightened modernity, along to the rescue came promissory estoppel, the 
knight in shining armor sprung thus from the First Restatement of Contracts: ‘A 
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’6 The notion of enforcing promises 
on the basis of reliance was of a piece with a broader movement toward the 
liberalization of contract law – as often as not in the service of widows, workers, 
and other vulnerable parties – and, during the ensuing half century, promissory 
estoppel smote the cold-hearted bargain theory in jurisdiction after jurisdiction, 
soon becoming a majority rule all of its own. 
 
 
6 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 90 (1932). 
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B. The Realist Account 
 
The legal realist version of the promissory estoppel story is a little different. 
Instead of a knight in shining armor, we get Dorothy Gale from Kansas, and 
she’s had the ruby slippers all along. And in place of the mainstream account of 
liberalizing progress, it’s a story of conflict between black-letter judicial 
pronouncements and the law ‘on the ground.’ In this account, we focus on the 
debates over the First Restatement, when the drafters – led by Samuel Williston, 
a/k/a Oz the Great and Powerful – were busy making the bargain theory of 
consideration the doctrinal centerpiece of their black-letter masterwork. They 
were not only enshrining it as an invariant requirement for the enforcement of 
promises but also using it to rationalize a host of other hoary doctrines, including 
the rules governing ‘past’ consideration (which infamously permitted a father to 
renege on a promise to pay for nursing care previously provided to his son by a 
good Samaritan7) as well as those governing mid-term contractual modifications 
(which likewise infamously permitted a ship’s captain to renege on a promised 
raise for sailors forced to work with assertedly unserviceable fishing nets8). 
And then along came Arthur Corbin, in the role of Toto pulling back the 
curtain to expose the Wizard’s humbug. As legend has it, Corbin announced to 
his fellow Restaters that he’d found hundreds of American decisions in which 
courts had enforced promises with no bargain in sight – an intervention made all 
the more impressive by the absence in those days of photocopy machines let 
alone on-line research tools.9 Some of the cases hailed from jurisdictions that had 
yet to adopt bargain theory and continued instead to embrace the antecedent 
English ‘benefit/detriment’ test for consideration. Under that test, either a benefit 
 
7 Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825). 
8 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
9 The account offered here of the respective roles played by Corbin and Williston follows the 
narrative made famous in Gilmore, supra note 1, at 62-63. Subsequent scholarship has called 
aspects of Gilmore’s narrative into question, but even those critiques credit Corbin’s work with 
exposing the considerable gap between bargain theory and then-existing caselaw. See James 
Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 California Law Review 547, 565-68 (1995); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 Michigan Law Review 1406, 1454-62 (1986-
87). 
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to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee would do the trick,10 and thus the 
widow’s move or other reliance suffered on the faith of even a concededly 
gratuitous promise might well have secured legal protection by establishing 
consideration via the required detriment. In other cases Corbin brought to the 
debate, courts expanded longstanding legal doctrines in order to enforce 
gratuitous promises that induced detrimental reliance. Foremost among those 
was equitable estoppel, a device available then as well as now to protect a party’s 
reliance on a misrepresentation of existing fact by ‘holding the perp to his lie’ – 
preventing (or ‘estopping’), for example, a minor from pleading youth as a basis 
for avoiding contractual liability where he has misrepresented his age to a 
merchant. For some courts, it was a short leap from ‘holding the perp to his lie’ 
to ‘holding the perp to his broken promise,’ when it was a promise of future 
conduct – rather than a misrepresentation of existing fact – that had induced 
reliance by its would-be beneficiary.11 
Corbin’s demonstration of a yawning gap between black-letter rules and ‘the 
law on the ground’ was part of a larger realist project that called into question 
the extent to which judges actually do what they say they are doing when they 
decide cases. That project was perhaps exemplified most dramatically by Karl 
Llewellyn’s iconic analysis of the ‘canons of construction,’ which presented a 
lengthy list of frequently encountered and utterly noncontroversial judicial 
pronouncements about how courts should interpret statutes, each of them paired 
with a likewise frequently encountered and utterly noncontroversial trope that 
completely contradicted its twin. (Compare, for example, ‘statutes in derogation 
of the common law shall be strictly construed’ with ‘remedial statutes shall be 
liberally construed’ – bearing in mind that ‘remedial’ statutes almost invariably 
‘derogate’ the very common law they are designed to ‘remedy.’12) 
As the realist story continues, Williston and his fellow drafters – who were 
committed, after all, to ‘restating’ the law of contracts – had no choice after 
Corbin’s demonstration but to include a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing 
promises on the basis of reliance. As a result, in the First Restatement promissory 
 
10 See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
11 See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). 
12 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 521-35 (1960). 
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estoppel took its place alongside consideration doctrine with no effort on the part 
of the drafters to explain how to square the bargain requirement with its seeming 
negation – at least where ‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise’ – a few short provisions later. So the lesson we’re to draw from the 
realist account is this: Don’t take all those confident black-letter pronouncements 
too seriously, for we should pay as much attention to what courts actually do as 
we do to what they say. And what they do turns out to be messy and 
complicated, often more responsive to facts, equities, and social policies than to 
solemn professions of doctrinal entailment. In other words, we should pay a lot 
more attention to the actions of the man behind the curtain and a bit less to his 
sound and fury. 
 
C. The Critical Account 
 
1.  Form and Substance in Contract Law 
 
And what’s the critical version of the story? In a nutshell, critical scholars 
found order in all that decisional messiness, contending that the man behind the 
curtain wasn’t just randomly contradicting himself; rather, they argued, he was 
contradicting himself in recurring and hence revealing ways. And what the 
scholarship brought to the surface was the profoundly ideological dimension of 
legal analysis and argument. While most critical scholars would have whole-
heartedly agreed with the realist insight that judicial professions of doctrinal 
entailment promise a bit more than they deliver, they nevertheless took the 
content of those professions seriously, mining the doctrinal material for hints, 
suggestions, and (with surprising frequency) forthright declarations of 
ideologically loaded assumptions and commitments. A principal critical lesson is 
thus that what courts say is very much a part of what courts do and that careful 
attention ought therefore be paid to the justificatory rhetoric of legal decisions as 
well as to decisional results. 
Turning to promissory estoppel, Duncan Kennedy’s seminal critical study 
unearthed a persistent conflict between individualism and altruism in American 
law – individualism characterized by an ethic of private autonomy and a legal 
system devoted to the facilitation of self-interested exchange vs. altruism 
characterized by an ethic of solidarity and judges at the ready to protect the 
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vulnerable and powerless.13 On this account, the tension between bargain theory 
and promissory estoppel is neither a drafting anomaly nor a transitional stage in 
the steady march to enlightened liberalization, but instead merely an instance – 
albeit a telling and central instance – of a larger and abiding conflict. Thus, under 
bargain theory, private autonomy and self-interest are trump, and the reneging 
promisor needn’t continue to provide the widow with a place to live since there’s 
nothing in it for him. But under promissory estoppel, solidarity rules the roost, 
and we’ll hold the cad to his word in order to protect a widow and family made 
vulnerable by reliance on his promise. 
Focusing principally on contract law, Kennedy revealed this conflict at work 
in an extraordinary number of doctrinal contexts.  But of even greater 
significance to our story was his further claim that there is a politics of legal form 
that corresponds to the politics of substantive conflict: a connection between 
individualism and a preference for governance via rigid rules (as in ‘a party is 
free to exit a contract without further obligation if his trading partner’s 
performance deviates in any respect from the terms of the parties’ agreement’), 
and a corresponding connection between altruism and a preference for flexible, 
fact-sensitive standards (as in ‘contractual exit isn’t permitted once the trading 
partner has substantially performed’). Kennedy located the link between form 
and substance in the rhetorical conventions of legal contestation, noting for 
example the focus on self-reliance in the arguments for both rigid rules and 
individualist outcomes (‘don’t expect the state to rescue you from your own 
improvidence!’) and the focus on sharing and sacrifice in the arguments for 
standards as well as altruist outcomes (’don’t expect the state to permit you to 
enjoy a windfall at your trading partner’s expense simply because her 
performance was imperfect in some minor respect!’).  
It is no coincidence, then, that bargain theory takes the form of a rule (a 
promise is binding if and only if there’s a quid pro quo) and that promissory 
estoppel is the poster child for a flexible standard (a promise is binding if the 
promisor should “reasonably” expect reliance by the promisee and “injustice can 
be avoided only by its enforcement”). But the larger payoff is that the careful 
study of legal rhetoric – dismissed by many realists as the after-the-fact 
 
13 Kennedy, supra note 2. 
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rationalization of results reached on unconscious or undisclosed grounds – could 
offer valuable insight into the role of ideological conflict in American law. 
 
2. Taking Argument Seriously 
 
And what were students to make of all this? My own experience – as a 
student of Kennedy and other first-generation cls scholars – was that critical 
teaching marked a vast improvement over what was going on in most of our 
other law school classes. And by the mid-1970s that was decidedly not legal 
realism, the lessons of which were typically reduced to sound-bites about the 
occasional role of policy in judicial decisions but otherwise ignored or dismissed 
with a glib reference to the contents of a judge’s breakfast. Indeed, critical 
scholars revived and revitalized realist insights about the gap between the 
rhetoric of reasoning and decisional results, unearthing ideological contestation 
not only in legal doctrine but also in the analysis of facts, equities, and social 
policies that realists had offered in their effort to explain the law ‘on the ground.’   
For those of us who entered the legal academy during that heady time, 
exploring patterned conflict in every darkened corner of legal analysis became a 
principal frame for the use of theory in the classroom, a practice some of us 
continue to this day. We offer it not for its own sake nor in order to demonstrate 
our chops with fancy philosophical concepts and jargon – great fun though that 
may be – but instead as a tool of demystification, of unveiling the law’s politics 
while at the same time recasting those otherwise seemingly random invocations 
of fact sensitivity, situational equities, and social policy as an integral part of the 
law rather than as the occasional handiwork of a rogue or dyspeptic judge. 
Paired Arguments. In my own classes, for example, we explore the ways in 
which ideological conflict frames not only the choice of legal rules but also the 
application of rules in particular cases. To continue the widow’s saga, let’s say 
the governing jurisdiction has a robust body of caselaw embracing the use of 
promissory estoppel in situations involving unbargained-for reliance, so there’s 
not much doubt that a court will apply promissory estoppel instead of bargain 
theory in the widow’s case. But as any victim of the Socratic method will tell you, 
this doesn’t mean a sure win for the widow, for the lawyers on each side still 
have plenty to argue about.  
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Thus, familiar conflicts will likely emerge over how to interpret the facts, 
with one side emphasizing the ‘four corners’ of the brother-in-law’s promise (he 
never said the widow could stay ‘forever’) and the other emphasizing the 
widow’s ‘reasonable expectations’ (but the promising party is her deceased 
husband’s brother whom she should surely be able to trust, and he’s offered the 
widowed mother of his brother’s children ‘a place to raise her family’); how to 
balance the equities, with one side emphasizing the point of view of the put-
upon promisor (he’s doing all the giving and getting nothing in return) and the 
other emphasizing the plight of the relying promisee (but the widow and her 
children moved many miles over difficult terrain on the faith of his promise, and 
they no longer have a home to return to if the eviction stands); and how to 
further sound social policy, with one side contending that promises should be 
narrowly construed lest folks be reluctant to make them and the other 
contending that promises should be broadly construed lest folks be reluctant to 
rely on them. 
Nesting. If I’m doing my job well, my students soon learn to recognize and 
even anticipate these and many other ‘paired arguments’ on their own.14 With 
the aid of some Socratic prodding, my students may also begin to discern the 
outlines of a larger pattern that frequently frames the deployment of the 
argument pairs they encounter: Conflict over the application of a legal rule often 
recapitulates the conflict attending the choice of that rule in the first place. To 
continue with the widow’s case, bargain theory may have ‘lost’ out as the 
governing rule of the jurisdiction in cases involving unbargained-for reliance, but 
it lives to fight another day as lawyers and judges contend over the application 
of promissory estoppel to particular facts. Thus, note that each of the ‘against the 
widow’ arguments rehearsed in the previous paragraph emphasizes the threat to 
the brother-in-law’s freedom and/or the absence of an exchange relation and thus 
draws on the individualistic underpinnings of bargain theory itself. Likewise, 
each of the ‘pro-widow’ arguments highlights the vulnerability that results from 
 
14 Most of them eventually figure out that a book on legal reasoning and law exams co-authored 
and shamelessly promoted by their professor can be of considerable assistance in this endeavor. 
See Richard Michael Fischl and Jeremy Paul, Getting to Maybe: How to Excel on Law School Exams 
(Carolina Academic Press 1999), which builds on the cls ‘legal semiotics’ work cited supra at 
notes 3 & 4. 
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her reliance on her brother-in-law’s promise and thus draws on the solidaristic 
underpinnings of promissory estoppel. The fancy name for this pattern – in 
which seemingly settled arguments re-emerge again and again at other levels of 
analysis – is ‘nesting,’ a phenomenon that is as familiar in contemporary political 
stalemates as it is in American legal reasoning. 
Framing. But the ideological character of law doesn’t stop there. A further 
insight of critical scholarship is that ideology not only organizes and permeates 
the arguments lawyers and judges routinely deploy but also helps to shape the 
way legal decisionmakers think about and come to understand legal issues and 
disputes. Consider one more time the widow’s case and yet another rhetorical 
pattern that is evident in the arguments posed on each side. Note that the 
arguments against the widow focus intensely on the brother-in-law’s promise, 
carefully delimiting its precise terms and emphasizing the absence of anything 
sought in return. By contrast, the arguments in the widow’s favor treat the 
promise as merely a starting point for analysis and focus more broadly on the 
context of the promise-making and on the events that follow.  
In class, I describe these contrasting approaches as ‘the snapshot vs. the film,’ 
and it’s easy to see how they might emerge from the competing world-views 
associated respectively with individualism and bargain theory (on the one hand) 
vs. altruism and promissory estoppel (on the other). To someone in the thrall of 
the former, virtually everything a legal decisionmaker needs to know can be 
captured at the moment of promising – either something is sought in exchange 
for the promise or it’s not, and at all events any restriction on a promisor’s 
freedom is strictly limited by the precise terms of his freely made promise. To 
someone of the opposing bent, the analysis certainly takes the promise into 
account but treats it as simply one event occurring within a larger narrative of 
the promisee’s susceptibility to the promisor’s lure and the life decisions she 
proceeds to take on the faith of his assurances. 
Of course these competing approaches to the framing of facts can be 
deployed instrumentally. If you’re a lawyer representing the brother-in-law – or 
a judge inclined to rule in his favor – you would be wise to emphasize ‘the 
snapshot’ (since those are the facts that favor his case) rather than ‘the film’ (since 
those facts tug the other way), and the reverse is naturally true of the widow’s 
lawyer or a judge sympathetic to her cause. But the argument here is that these 
competing conceptions of contractual obligation can also influence and shape the 
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way a dispute is understood by legal actors, operating as a powerful heuristic 
through which lawyers arguing a case – and judges deciding it – may come to 
decide what counts as a legally relevant fact and what feels like a compelling 
story. 
Flipping. One might assume from the discussion thus far that the critical take 
follows the mainstream and realist accounts in treating promissory estoppel as 
the ‘hero’ and bargained-for consideration as the ‘villain,’ and that is indeed 
often the case: promissory estoppel has frequently come to the rescue of widows, 
workers, and other vulnerable parties left out in the cold by bargain theory. But 
in much the same way that ‘wins’ at the choice-of-rule level can turn into ‘losses’ 
during rule-application, the choice of rule can itself have unintended 
consequences, and advocates should be careful what they wish for. If today 
consideration doctrine thwarts the effort of workers to modify their employment 
contracts to secure additional pay for unexpectedly difficult work,15 tomorrow 
they might deploy the doctrine in their favor and resist contractual modifications 
by an employer seeking to eliminate previously promised job security.16 And if 
today promissory estoppel might come to the aid of the widow Kirksey in her 
efforts to house her children, tomorrow it might be deployed in an effort to force 
her to give up a child she has brought to term.17 We call this ‘flipping’ – using a 
rule against its seemingly natural beneficiary – and lawyers who succeed in the 
maneuver are likely to enjoy the double entendre almost as much as the win. 
Form and Substance Redux: Individualism and Formalism Reloaded. So how has 
the larger conflict between solidarity and self-regard fared in the intervening 
decades? The individualism Kennedy described in the mid-1970s was a 
chastened one, bloodied and even bowed a bit by the realist critique. Reluctant to 
proclaim the moral primacy of naked self-interest – a heavy lift in a culture 
venerating Mother Teresa as the paragon of virtue – its partisans hedged their 
bets by invoking the invisible hand (‘selfishness in service of the public good’) or 
defending individualism with ‘clenched teeth’, acknowledging its moral 
 
15 See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902)(the ‘sorry about the fishing nets 
but kidding about that raise’ case). 
16 See Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelhein Pharmacy, 234 Conn. 1, 13-17 (1995). 
17 See Brown C. Lewis, Due Date: Enforcing Surrogacy Promises in the Best Interests of the Child, 
87 St. John’s Law Review 899, 940-42 (2013). 
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deficiencies but contending that efforts to suppress it via the legal system would 
lead to greater evils still.18 
Needless to say, contemporary individualism seems to have ‘gotten over’ 
realism as well as apologetics, exuding a muscular moral confidence and 
worshipping at the neoliberal altar of freedom of choice. (Workers of the world 
unite: we are all consumers now.) By contrast, altruism has been humbled by an 
extended encounter with law and economics, frequently reduced to the role of 
addressing market imperfections – instances of market access and information 
barriers, collective action problems, toxic externalities, transaction costs and the 
like – in order to fend off a nigh hegemonic deregulatory agenda with a pitch for 
modest ‘win-win’ interventions and ‘regulation lite.’19  
Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise that promissory estoppel has been 
taken down a notch, with partisans of individualism proclaiming ‘the death of 
reliance’ and the relegation of the doctrine to a market-serving role.20 To be sure, 
the celebration may be somewhat premature. As a distinguished defender of the 
older order demonstrated in a careful study of what American courts are actually 
doing in promissory estoppel cases, reliance remains crucial to recovery, yet even 
he conceded that estoppel claims face an uphill battle in most courts.21  
A similar development is evident in the contemporary politics of rules and 
standards, the neoformalist dimension of this neoliberal moment. In Kennedy’s 
account – and as the realists demonstrated – formalism was often a mug’s game 
as rules promised more predictability and constraint than they could deliver, 
partly a result of proliferating counter-rules and exceptions and partly because 
judges were unwilling to ‘bite the bullet’ when a particular rule’s under- or over-
inclusion would lead to manifest unfairness.22 But today the shoe is on the other 
 
18 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1716. 
19 See Richard Michael Fischl, Efficiency and Its Discontents, Jurisprudence: An International 
Journal of Legal and Political Thought (forthcoming 2018). 
20 See Randy Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 Journal of Legal Education 518 (1996); Nathan B. 
Oman, The Dignity of Commerce (U. Chicago 2017). 
21 Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 Columbia Law Review 580, 619 (1998). 
22 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1700-01. 
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foot, and it is extraordinary how often standards crafted to post-realist tastes get 
‘rule-i-fied’ into a rigid repertoire of constituent elements.  
Promissory estoppel is again a case in point. Virtually any analysis of the 
doctrine’s application to a particular dispute is likely to begin with a rote 
recitation of ‘elements’ that must be satisfied for a claim to succeed: (1) a 
promise; (2) a reasonable expectation of reliance on the part of the promisor; (3) 
reliance-in-fact by the promisee; and (4) a showing that injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise.23 Predictably, this has prompted many 
courts to adopt a ‘checklist’ approach to decisionmaking – examining each of the 
elements in isolation and thus ignoring the forest in a search for individual trees 
– though once again there are cases and commentary to the contrary.24 
 
3. The Taken-for-Granted, the Trump, and the ‘Tells’ 
 
  The argumentative techniques described in the previous section suggest a 
great deal of ‘play in the joints’ in legal reasoning. The fancy term for this is 
‘indeterminacy,’ the notion that (some, many, most, all?) cases might be decided 
‘either way’ despite the ritual declarations of doctrinal constraint by American 
judges. Yet there is a competing tradition of critical work that takes those 
declarations seriously, searching them for hints of what is ‘taken for granted’ by 
decisionmakers, assumptions so deeply ingrained in American legal thinking 
that they may trump more conventional sources of law in what passes for 
reasoning and analysis. Examples abound, and seasoned observers learn to 
recognize the ‘tells’: when, for example, a court introduces a proposition reeking 
of race, gender, or class bias with an ‘of course,’ a ‘clearly,’ or similar language 
designed to assure the reader that what follows is so incredibly obvious it needs 
neither authoritative nor evidentiary support25; or bases the resolution of a 
 
23 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.19 (4th ed. 2004). 
24 See Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 Fordham Law Review 303 
(1992)(critiquing judicial and scholarly treatment of promise and reliance as discrete elements 
detached from the context of the parties’ relationship); for contrasting cases illustrating the point, 
see footnotes XXX-XXX infra and accompanying text. 
25 See Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979)(emphasis added), rejecting the argument that 
employee pension plans are investments protected by federal securities law: 
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factual dispute on a cringeworthy economic analysis parading as a dispassionate 
evaluation of the evidence26; or runs roughshod over statutory text, legislative 
history, and precedent as it confidently reaffirms existing relations of power 
(merchants over consumers, capital over labor, racial domination, patriarchy, 
hetero-normativity, etc.).27  In such cases, the reader can be forgiven for 
suspecting that something other than random error is at work and that 
ideological commitments are shaping what passes for ‘common sense’ among 
legal thinkers. You could fill books and book-length articles with tales of 
ideologically charged assumptions exerting their influence on various areas of 
 
 
Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee “exchanges” some portion of 
his labor in return for [his pension plan]. . . . His decision to accept and retain covered 
employment may have only an attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived investment 
possibilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an 
employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment. 
 
26 See Domenico v. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 112 F. 554, 556 (N.D. Cal. 1901), aff’d, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 
1902)(once again the ‘sorry about the fishing nets but kidding about that raise’ case): 
 
The contention of [the sailors] that the nets provided them were rotten and unserviceable is 
not sustained by the evidence. The [employer’s] interest required that [the sailors] should be 
provided with every facility necessary to their success as fishermen, for on such success 
depended the profits [the employer] would be able to realize that season from its packing 
plant, and the large capital invested therein. In view of this self-evident fact, it is highly 
improbable that the [employer] gave [the sailors] rotten and unserviceable nets with which to 
fish. 
 
27 Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing fine-print terms of 
document first encountered by consumer upon opening a shrink-wrapped shipping carton 
containing goods consumer had already paid for) with the express language of U.C.C. § 2-
206(1)(b) (under which the deal would have been closed – and the contract fully formed – no later 
than the moment the merchant shipped the goods); the express language of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) 
(under which the fine-print terms of the merchant’s ‘late hit’ would have constituted mere 
‘proposals’ that the consumer was free to reject); and Official Comment # 1 to the latter provision 
(which states that § 2-207 governs transactions involving a single form, contrary to the court’s 
citation-free assertion that the provision is ‘irrelevant’ to  shrink-wrap  transactions since ‘there is 
only one form’). 
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American law, and critical scholars have been developing a rich body of work 
doing just that since the dawn of the movement.28 
 
* * * * * 
 
So what did the insights of critical legal studies mean to those of us who 
came to law school eager to use the law for social justice work?  That depended a 
lot on what you wanted from the law. If you were looking for a sure bet in the 
service of progressive transformation, you were in serious trouble. In Dorothy’s 
immortal words, there was nothing in that little black bag for you – no invincible 
argument in the Constitution, the common law, or anywhere else you could 
count on to get you where you wanted to go.  
But if you wanted to understand the law – to move beyond the mainstream 
myths of liberalizing progress and ‘just doin’ my job ma’am’ doctrine-crunching 
– it seemed like you’d come to the right place. As you prepared for law practice, 
the relentless revelation of argument-pairs and larger structures of ideological 
conflict went some distance to diminish the sense that the law was hopelessly 
stacked against the good and the true. You learned that there was a lot of 
‘deviant’ doctrine out there – that hidden in the maze of legal argument there 
was solidarity as well as self-regard, a legacy of regulation as well as laissez-
faire. There was, in other words, the thrill of mastering the master’s tools and 
sometimes the master himself, for it was often possible – with the help of hard 
work, creative energy, and a wee bit of luck – to develop a counterargument that 
might find some purchase and do some good. 
Developing a keen eye for the ‘taken for granted’ and an appreciation for its 
influence was enormously useful as well, offering more than occasional glimpses 
of the law’s otherwise hidden argumentative terrain. To be sure, an extended 
encounter with that terrain was seldom a cause for celebration. But to recall the 
 
28 For classics of the genre, see Karl Klare, The Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and 
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minnesota Law Review 265 (1978); 
Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minnesota Law Review 1049 (1978); Fran Olsen, The 
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harvard Law Review 1497 
(1983). 
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mantra of untenured critical scholars during the anti-cls backlash of the 1980s, at 
least it meant you would ‘never underestimate the danger you are in.’ Yet a 
clear-eyed understanding of the law’s politics was not inevitably a downer, for 
there were emancipatory possibilities as well. For one thing, it was liberating 
(even sanity-preserving) to vindicate the intuition that law had a politics, 
countering the persistent mainstream myth that law and politics were distinct 
and dichotomous phenomena. For another, there was the prospect that exposing 
the exercise of power behind the pretensions of constraint and necessity – much 
as Toto tugged back the curtain to reveal the Wizard as an ordinary man – might 
embarrass power’s apologists into a day of reckoning or even a change of course.  
 
III.  Promissory Estoppel and Local 1330: A Critical Study 
 
A.  The case 
 
The value of critical methodology is best assessed by seeing it in action, and 
thus I’ll conclude the chapter with an examination of an illustrative case: Local 
1330 v U.S. Steel, a tragically unsuccessful effort in the late 1970s to prevent the 
closing of two aging steel plants in the industrial Midwest.29 I’ve chosen the case 
for a number of reasons. For one thing, inspired by a most engaging conference a 
few years back, I have resumed teaching the case in my courses and had recent 
occasion to put some thoughts about it to writing.30 For another, the case 
represents a nodal point in American history, a harbinger of late twentieth 
century deindustrialization as well as of the declining fortunes of labour unions 
and the ‘rust belt’ workers they represented, developments explored with alarm 
by progressive economists and legal scholars several decades before the 2016 US 
 
29 Steelworkers Union, Local No. 1330 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1980), 
aff’d Local 1330, Steelworkers Union v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). 
30 See Local 1330 v. U.S. Steel: 30 Years Later (Harvard Law School, Feb. 25, 2011), proceedings 
available at http://legalleft.org/conferences/local-1330-conference/; Fischl, Teaching Law as a 
Vocation, supra note *. 
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presidential election brought them forcefully to forefront of American politics.31 
And for still another, the case turns out to have been an early symptom of the 
neoliberal/neoformalist turn described earlier. 
The case was filed against U.S. Steel, the plants’ owner, by union locals (‘the 
union’, for ease of expression) representing some 3500 affected employees. The 
action sought to enjoin the threatened closure via promissory estoppel, 
contending that the employer had broken its promise to keep the plants open if 
the workers redoubled their production efforts and succeeded in making the 
plants ‘profitable.’ In the litigation that ensued, there was little dispute that the 
workers had accomplished and indeed sacrificed a great deal on the faith of that 
promise, but in the end the courts rejected their claim on the basis of a finding 
that the effort had fallen short of the ‘profitability’ benchmark.32 
The profitability issue was hotly disputed by the parties. For its part, the 
union took its evidence straight from the horse’s mouth, citing repeated 
representations by company officials – from the superintendent of the doomed 
plants to the chair of the company’s board of directors – that profitability had 
indeed been achieved at the plants, and that company representatives made this 
point repeatedly in communications to the workers as well as in various 
statements to the press.33 At trial, the company argued that the profitability 
claim was accurate only with respect to the fixed costs of operating the plants 
and did not take into account a fair allocation of company-wide purchasing, 
sales, and management expenses. When the latter were included in the calculus, 
officials claimed, the plants were operating at a loss despite the many 
contemporaneous public declarations to the contrary.34 
In the end, both the district court and the court of appeals embraced the 
definition of profitability U.S. Steel asserted at trial, though the courts offered 
differing rationales for doing so. The district court treated the profitability 
benchmark as a ‘condition precedent’ to liability under promissory estoppel and 
 
31 See Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (Basic Books 1984); 
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Law, 40 Stanford Law Review 611 
(1988). 
32 492 F. Supp. at 3-8; 631 F.2d at 1269-79. 
33 631 F.2d at 1272-74. 
34 Id. at 1279.  
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concluded that the union had failed to overcome the company’s showing.35 The 
appellate court steered clear of the lower court’s ‘condition precedent’ analysis, 
reasoning instead that it was unreasonable for the workers to read the union’s 
version of profitability into the company’s promise.36 But the courts were very 
much on the same page with respect to the tragedy at hand, the district court 
lamenting that U.S. Steel ‘should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area 
devastated after drawing from the lifeblood of the community for so many 
years’,37 and the appellate court describing the situation as an ‘an economic 
tragedy of major proportion’ and a ‘devastating blow’ to the employees as well 
as the Youngstown community.38 
 
B.  Critique 
 
1.  The path not taken 
 
A central lesson of the ‘critical legal history’ of promissory estoppel is the 
tension between the ethic of solidarity and mutual dependence reflected in that 
doctrine (on the one hand) and the ethic of private autonomy and individual self-
interest reflected in the bargain theory of consideration (on the other). Thus, 
when a court treats promissory estoppel as the governing rule – as did both the 
district court and the court of appeals in Local 1330 – solidarity has seemingly 
won the day. But if the union thus enjoyed the legal equivalent of ‘the home field 
advantage’, why didn’t it go on to succeed with its claim? As suggested earlier, 
an important insight of critical work is that the choice of the governing rule 
frequently marks just the beginning rather than the end of conflict and that the 
application of the chosen rule to the facts of a particular case presents an occasion 
to fight that fight again. As it happens, Local 1330 offers a striking example of this 
phenomenon. 
 
35 492 F. Supp. at 7. 
36 631 F. 2d at 1279.  
37 492 F. Supp. at 9. 
38 Id. at 1265. 
20 5/15/18 Draft   
 
Let’s begin with a close examination of the reasoning offered by the courts in 
support of the result, and at this point we’ll focus on the court of appeals since it 
had the final and authoritative say. Thus, the appellate court began its analysis 
by asserting that ‘the profitability issue in the case depends in large part upon 
definition’ and went on to critique the union’s version for failing to account for 
company-wide expenses fairly allocable to the Youngstown operation.39  
‘Obviously,’ the court observed, ‘any multiplant corporation could quickly go 
bankrupt if such a definition of profit was employed generally and over any 
period of time.’40  The court’s analysis continued: 
 
Plaintiffs point out, however, that this version of Youngstown profitability was 
employed by the Youngstown management in setting a goal for its employees and in 
statements which described achieving that goal. The standard of Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 90, upon which plaintiffs-appellants rely, however, is one of 
reasonable expectability of the “promise” detrimentally relied upon. The District Judge did 
not find, nor can we, that reliance upon a promise to keep these plants open on the 
basis of coverage of plant fixed costs was within reasonable expectability. We cannot 
hold that the District Judge erred legally or was “clearly erroneous” in his fact finding 
when he held that the “promise” to keep the plants open had to be read in the context 
of normal corporate profit accounting and that profitability had not been achieved.41 
 
The court thus acknowledged that the union’s definition of profitability was the 
version embraced by U.S. Steel in contemporaneous public statements but 
dismissed that fact as irrelevant to its ‘reasonable expectability of the “promise”’ 
test. Exactly why the statements of company officials to the workers had no 
bearing on ‘reasonable expectability’ is not explained, though the clumsy 
formulation is notable for its erasure of speaker and spoken-to alike. The court 
thus evidently viewed ‘expectability’ as a quality inhering in ‘the “promise”’, 
and, together with those scare quotes, this suggests a focus on the promise in and 
of itself. There is caselaw supporting this approach, which is consistent with what 
I described earlier as the neoformalist tendency to ‘rule-i-fy’ standards by 
 
39 Id. at 1279. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (emphasis added). 
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analyzing the constituent elements in isolation from one another.42 And when 
the inquiry is framed that way – severed from parties and context – it is no 
surprise that ‘profitability’ might be read through the lens of ‘normal corporate 
profit accounting’ and that events extrinsic to its making (like the repeated 
assurances that the benchmark had been met) would be ignored as beside the 
point.  
Students who have begun to master the hunt for ‘paired arguments’ will 
recognize the move the court has made here – focusing like a laser beam on the 
‘four corners’ of the promise – and begin the search for its missing rhetorical 
twin, the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the parties, as we saw during our imagined 
re-litigation of Kirksey (“I didn’t promise she could stay forever!” vs. “He’s my 
dead husband’s brother, and he assured me of a place to ‘raise my family’!”). As 
it happens, the twin can without much difficulty be found in the relevant legal 
materials. The court’s ‘reasonable expectability’ formulation offers a nod in that 
direction, though it is (again) treated as a quality of the promise, while the text of 
§ 90 focuses instead on the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the parties and specifically 
on the expectations of the promising party regarding the likely effect of the 
promise on the promisee. The language of the provision can thus be read to ask 
not how the promise should be read in isolation and by some disinterested third 
party – let alone by a ‘corporate accountant’, normal or otherwise – but instead 
how the real-world promisor should reasonably expect the real-world promisees 
to understand it and respond.  
Turning back our case, once we bring our particular promisor’s expectations 
about likely reliance into the picture, it is hard to dispute that U.S. Steel should 
have expected its workers to believe precisely what company officials had 
repeatedly told them to believe – that the plants were once again profitable – 
right up to the moment the parties headed for court. Nor is there any suggestion 
in the text of § 90 that inquiry should be limited to the promisor’s expectations at 
 
42 See Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W. 2d 23, 27-28 (Mo. App. 1997) (rejecting argument that 
promissory estoppel claim should focus primarily on ‘how the promise relates to “its ability to 
provoke reliance” rather than just the promise in isolation’ and basing the analysis instead ‘on the 
alleged promise itself’). 
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the moment the promise is made, and there is caselaw on this side of the issue as 
well.43 
Note that the ‘four corners of the promise’ vs. ‘reasonable expectations’ 
standoff presents a classic example of argument ‘nesting’ as well. If bargain 
theory lost the ‘choice of governing rule’ debate with promissory estoppel, it 
nevertheless lived to fight another day in the application of the supposed winner 
to the facts of Local 1330. Thus, if the union’s argument was all about the reliance 
generated by the company’s promises, the company focused instead on the price 
it exacted for the continued operation of the mill and resisted enforcement 
because it did not in the end get what it sought in return (dare we say ‘bargained 
for’?): profitability.  
We can likewise see how these opposed legal theories ‘framed’ the parties’ 
contrasting presentations of the case. The company’s pitch enabled it to ‘stop the 
action’ at the moment of promising and offer a ‘close-up’ of the promise itself. If 
this sounds a bit like what we described earlier as the ‘snapshot,’ then the 
union’s contrasting account offers ‘the film,’ bringing the story of the workers’ 
reliance into sharp relief and revealing the role that the company’s assurances of 
profitability played in its sustained effort to induce its workers to rely to the hilt. 
To put it another way, the union’s ‘film’ focused on what the word 
‘profitable’ did, whereas the company’s ‘snapshot’ focused on what the word 
‘profitable’ meant. Thus, the court took a ‘deep dive’ into the language of the 
company’s promise, and, in the abstract, it is difficult to argue with the logic that 
‘any multiplant corporation could quickly go bankrupt’ if apportioned company-
wide expenses were not taken into account in determining the profitability of an 
individual plant.  
But it demeans the Youngstown workers to suggest – as did the court of 
appeals, the company, and not a few contemporaneous commentators – that 
their expectations were the product of a naïve and homespun failure to come to 
grips with the rules of ‘normal corporate profit accounting’ when those 
expectations were in fact shaped by the public proclamations of company 
officials that the redoubled productivity effort was succeeding and that the 
plants were once again profitable. The assurances of profitability were thus an 
 
43 See Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire Co., 792 F. Supp. 1074, 1081-82 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (post-promise 
events relevant to reasonableness of promisee reliance). 
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integral part of the promising, deployed for precisely the same purpose, and to 
precisely the same effect, as the initial round of promises: As part of a calculated 
effort to boost the workers’ morale and induce them to continue their sacrifices 
and redoubled efforts right up to the last possible moment. 
 
2.  Here be dragons 
 
If cogent legal arguments might thus have justified an outcome in the union’s 
favor, why did those arguments fail to persuade judges otherwise so seemingly 
sympathetic with the workers’ plight? We have been focusing thus far on the 
opinion of the court of appeals, but a close look at the district court’s handiwork 
may be revealing in this respect. It will be recalled that the lower court treated 
the profitability benchmark as a ‘condition precedent’ to promissory estoppel 
liability and that the appellate court took a different approach, treating 
profitability as a part of the company’s promise under § 90. The appellate court 
nevertheless affirmed the lower court’s finding that the company’s definition of 
the term, rather than the union’s, established the applicable productivity target, 
quoting with approval the following passage from the lower court opinion: 
 
This Court is loathe to exchange its own view of the parameters of profitability for 
that of the corporation. It is clear that there is little argument as to the production 
figures for the Youngstown mills—the controversy surrounds the interpretation of 
those figures. . . . Perhaps if this Court were being asked to interpret the word 
“profit” in a written contract between plaintiffs and defendant, some choice would 
have to be made. Given the oral nature of the alleged promises in the case at bar and 
the obvious ambiguity of the statements made, this Court finds that there is a very 
reasonable basis on which it can be said that Youngstown facilities were not 
profitable. Further, plaintiffs have made no showing of bad faith on the part of the 
Board of Directors in the Board’s determination of profitability, nor have they given 




44 631 F. 2d at 1278-79, quoting 492 F. Supp. at 7. 
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In sum, the district court found that there was ‘a very reasonable basis’ for the 
company’s interpretation of ‘profitability’ and further found that the union had 
failed to counter that position by showing it to be ‘unrealistic or unreasonable’ or 
offered in ‘bad faith.’  But the court did not explain why the union bore a burden 
that the company did not. Perhaps its thinking was influenced by the view that 
profitability was a ‘condition precedent’ to company liability, prompting it to 
assume that the union bore the burden of proving the condition’s fulfillment. Yet 
the court didn’t say that, and focused instead on the ‘oral nature of the alleged 
promises,’ suggesting somewhat cryptically that it might have reached a 
different conclusion if a ‘written contract’ were at stake. (Because we construe 
writings against the drafter but oral statements against the listener?) Less cryptic 
is the opening sentence of the analysis: ‘This Court is loathe to exchange its own 
view of the parameters of profitability for that of the corporation’. The sentiment 
is expressed with an air of conviction that is otherwise notably absent in the 
passage and may go a long way to explain why the court viewed the union’s 
challenge to the company’s version as an uphill and ultimately unsuccessful 
battle. 
A seasoned labour lawyer would have smelled trouble the moment she 
encountered the quoted phrase, for it is a ritual incantation in cases challenging 
an employer’s right to close a business and decided under (if not exactly in 
accord with) the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, the NLRA prohibits all 
manner of retaliation against employees who decide to unionize, but there is a 
judicial carve-out for business closure in retaliation for a pro-union vote, despite 
the Supreme Court’s candid acknowledgement that such closure ‘is 
encompassed within the literal language’ of the governing provision.45  The 
NLRA likewise requires an employer to bargain with a union representing its 
employees over ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,’ 
but there is a judicially created exception for an employer’s decision to close a 
plant despite the Court’s candid acknowledgement that the quoted statutory 
language ‘plainly cover[s] termination of employment which . . . necessarily 
results from closing an operation.’46  To appreciate the vigor with which this 
 
45 Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965). 
46 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981)(internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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particular American exceptionalism is policed, consider the following passage 
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the retaliatory closing case (the 
italics are mine):  
 
But none of this can be taken to mean that an employer does not have the absolute right, at all 
times, to permanently close and go out of business, or to actually dispose of his business to 
another, for whatever reason he may choose, whether union animosity or anything else, and 
without his being thereby left subject to a remedial liability under the Labor Management 
Relations Act . . . .47 
 
Who talks like that?  Certainly not American judges in any other setting and 
especially not in labour law cases when they are ruling in favor of employee 
rights, which are invariably described in apologetic and oh-so-carefully hedged 
terms.  
If the unambiguous provisions of a federal statute can’t resist a business 
closure override, a ‘mere’ state-based common law doctrine like promissory 
estoppel isn’t likely to fare much better. But what is even more telling about the 
deployment of the ‘won’t exchange our own views for the company’s’ trope in 
Local 1330 is its utter inapplicability to the facts at hand. The union was not, after 
all, asking the court to substitute the court’s ‘own views’ of profitability for the 
views of responsible officials at U.S. Steel. It was asking instead that the court 
hold the company to the meaning of ‘profitability’ repeatedly and publicly 
proclaimed by its officers and agents, and to prevent its lawyers from 
substituting an entirely different meaning of the term despite the extensive and 
intended reliance of the workers on those earlier pronouncements. 
There is a name for holding a party to out-of-court representations designed 
to mislead in this manner: equitable estoppel, the tried-and-true common law 
doctrine that, as noted earlier, was an important historical precursor to estoppel 
of the promissory variety. In its application, the court’s ‘own views’ of the 
meaning of profitability would have been no more relevant than the court’s own 
view of the ‘real’ age of a minor who passed a fake I.D. to a merchant and then 
attempted to invoke his youth to disaffirm the contract thus procured. Yet an 
American court hears the words ‘plant closure’ and finds itself chanting a robotic 
 
47 Darlington, 380 U.S. at 271 (quoting NLRB v. New Madrid Manufacturing Co., 215 F.2d 908, 
914 (8th Cir. 1954)). 
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mantra (‘Must . . . Not . . . Substitute . . . My . . . Views . . .!’), drawn nigh 
irresistibly to an all too predictable result, never mind the facts let alone the 
consequences. 
